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The role of the side channels in the continuous-variable quantum key distribution is studied. It is
shown how the information leakage through a side channel from the trusted sender station increases
the vulnerability of the protocols to the eavesdropping in the main quantum communication channel.
Moreover, the untrusted noise infusion by an eavesdropper on the trusted receiving side breaks the
security even for a purely attenuating main quantum channel. As a method to compensate for the
effect of the side-channel leakage on the sender side, we suggest several types of manipulations on
the side-channel input. It is shown that by applying the modulated coherent light on the input of
the side channel that is optimally correlated to the modulation on the main signal and optionally,
introducing additional squeezing in the case of the squeezed-state protocol, the negative influence
of the lossy side channel on the sender side can be completely removed. For the trusted receiving
side, the method of optimal monitoring of the residual noise from the side-channel noise infusion is
suggested and shown to be able to completely eliminate the presence of the noisy side channel. We
therefore prove that the side-channel effects can be completely removed using feasible operations if
the trusted parties access the respective parts of the side channels.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is a major
communication application of quantum information the-
ory aiming at the development of protocols for establish-
ing secure channels protected by the laws of quantum
physics. Such channels can then be used to share a se-
cure key for classical symmetrical cryptographic systems.
Recently, continuous-variable (CV) [3] protocols of QKD
(see [4] for review) were developed and implemented on
the basis of squeezed [5–7] or coherent [8–12] states. The
security of CV QKD protocols in the case of Gaussian
modulation was then shown against collective attacks in
the presence of channel noise [13, 14], which also implies
the security against the most general coherent attacks
[15, 16].
CV QKD protocols, however, suffer from various im-
perfections. The most threatening are the untrusted
(i.e., being under full control of a potential eavesdrop-
per) quantum channels, which are inclined to losses due
to the attenuation and can add excess noise in the link.
Such noise can also be detection noise indistinguishable
from the effect of the channel. In security analysis it is
then supposed that all the channel imperfections are due
to the presence on an eavesdropper. It was an impor-
tant step in the development of CV QKD when with the
use of reverse reconciliation it was shown possible to es-
tablish asymptotically secure key transmission upon any
pure channel loss [9], while noise remains limiting to the
security of the protocols.
However, the insecure quantum channel is not neces-
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sarily the single source of information leakage from a
QKD protocol. A potential eavesdropper can use imper-
fections of the trusted (i.e., fully controlled by the trusted
parties) devices such as sources and detectors to gain at
least partial information on the signal being sent or to
control the measurement being performed at the receiver
station. The noise, which is present on the trusted sides,
can be fully controlled and calibrated by the trusted par-
ties. Such noise, however, can still be harmful. It was
shown in particular that the preparation noise can al-
ready break the security in the reverse reconciliation pro-
tocol [17], but can be suppressed [18] or tolerated in the
direct reconciliation scheme [19, 20]. Also, the trusted
detection noise limits the key rate, but can be partially
helpful to make the protocol more robust against noise
in the quantum channel [21, 22].
In the less optimistic scenario the noise or loss on the
trusted sides can however be under partial control of an
eavesdropper, as depicted in Fig. 1(a). This is the case of
the side channels, which we define as auxiliary channels
that have either input or output controlled by a trusted
party but output or input, respectively, controlled by an
eavesdropper. From this point of view, the side channels
differ from the main channel between the sender and re-
ceiver. Supposedly, any additional information can be
used by an attacker to increase the knowledge about the
transmitted key. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate
the influence the side channels can have on security. In
the following study we summarize all possible sources of
side information and define them together as the side
channels on either the sender or the receiver side of the
protocol.
One possible way to overcome the negative influ-
ence of the side channels is implementing the so-called
measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD protocols
[23], which were recently suggested on the basis of CVs
2[24, 25], where the trusted detection stations become
shielded from a potential eavesdropper. However, the ap-
plicability of the device-independent CV QKD protocols
is still very limited, particularly in terms of distance.
In the present paper we study the effect of the
side channels in CV QKD protocols with coherent and
squeezed states of light. We define the side channels as
the imperfections (signal loss and noise) on the trusted
sides, which are under partial control of an eavesdrop-
per. In particular, we consider (A) the leakage from the
trusted sender station and (B) measurement manipula-
tion by the noise addition in the trusted receiver station.
We show the degradation of the key rate and increase
of vulnerability to the channel noise in the presence of
a side-channel leakage. We also show a security break
from the noisy side channel on the detection stage. We
suggest methods to compensate for the negative influence
of the described side channels. For (A) we consider the
possibility to classically apply an additional correlated
signal on the side-channel input, which is under control
of a trusted sender party. We show the positive effect
of such additional modulation and the possibility to op-
timize the modulation variance for the given parameters
of the protocol. Moreover, we show that by applying cor-
related information encoding and squeezing the input of
the side channel, in the case of the squeezed-state pro-
tocol, the trusted party is able to completely decouple
the side channel from the signal. By decoupling here
we mean decorrelation (reducing or turning the corre-
lation to zero) and stopping the leakage of information
through the side channel, which completely removes the
negative impact of the side channel. For (B) we show
the possibility to cancel the infused detection noise by
monitoring the output of such a noise-infusing side chan-
nel. These are the alternative ways of active compen-
sation of the side channels in the Gaussian CV QKD
protocols with the trusted sender and receiver stations,
which keep the advantage of usability of such protocols,
including the longer channel distances, compared to the
device-independent protocols [23–25], and do not involve
entanglement or non-Gaussian operations and measure-
ments. If for any reason the input of the sender-side
leakage or the output of the receiver-side noise infusion
are not available for the manipulations or monitoring, re-
spectively, then the negative impact of the side channels
shown in the current paper has to be either taken into
account in the security analysis or compensated for by
the possible use of the MDI schemes.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II we de-
fine the side channels and recapitulate the methods of
CV QKD security analysis being used. In Sec. III we
demonstrate the negative impact of the side channels on
the CV QKD security. In Sec. IV we introduce the meth-
ods aimed at compensating for the negative effect of the
side channels. We summarize in Sec. V.
II. TYPES OF SIDE CHANNELS.
We study the effect of the side channels on the stan-
dard and optimized CV QKD protocols [7, 26, 27] on
the basis of the Gaussian modulation of squeezed and
coherent states, as depicted in Fig. 1(a). The trusted
sending side (Alice) prepares the signal state (squeezed
or coherent) with variance VS (so that VS < 1 or VS = 1,
respectively) using the source S. Alice then applies ran-
dom Gaussian quadrature displacement of variance VM
(also referred to as the modulation variance), so that
the overall variance of the modulated states becomes
V , using the modulator M . The prepared state travels
through the untrusted channel parametrized by trans-
mittance (loss) η and excess noise ǫ both being under
full control of an eavesdropper (Eve). The signal is then
detected by the remote receiving party (Bob) using the
homodyne detector H. Further, with no loss of gener-
ality, we assume that the quadrature x is measured by
Bob. Thus, in the standard Gaussian CV QKD pro-
tocol (without the side channels) Alice applies displace-
ment xM to the signal quadrature xS and sends the state
with the quadrature xA = xS + xM to the channel so
that the variances are V ar(xA) = V , V ar(xS) = VS
and V ar(xM ) = VM and then VS + VM = V . In the
standard Gaussian CV QKD squeezed-state protocol [26]
the signal states are modulated up to the antisqueezing
(variance of the quadrature complementary to a squeezed
one), so VM = 1/VS−VS holds, i.e., the variance of mod-
ulation is fixed by squeezing of the signal states. We
will also consider the optimized Gaussian CV QKD pro-
tocols [7, 27], where modulation VM is independent of
the variance of the signal states and can be freely op-
timized for a given signal resource and parameters of
the setup. The quantum channel transforms the mod-
ulated signal such that Bob measures the quadrature
xB = (xA + xN )
√
η + x0
√
1− η, where x0 is the quadra-
ture of the vacuum input of the channel loss and xN is the
quadrature of the channel excess noise with the variances
V ar(x0) = 1 and V ar(xN ) = ǫ.
Note that the trusted parties must know the channel
parameters to assess the security of the protocols and
therefore the channel must be properly estimated. While
the issue of the channel estimation was recently studied in
the finite-size context [28], in the present paper we focus
on the side-channel effects and assume that the channel
parameters are already known to the trusted parties. The
channel estimation is still possible in the presence of the
side channels because the side-channel parameters (losses
and noise) can be estimated independently by the local
measurements on the trusted sides. This also allows us
to consider the protocols based on the preparation and
measurement of a single quadrature (e.g., x), while the
channel estimation would require additional modulation
and measurement in the complementary one. Moreover,
since the methods of the side-channel compensation sug-
gested below do not change the data ensemble size (de-
fined by the signaling and detection rate), the finite-size
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FIG. 1: (a) Scheme of the CV QKD based on signal state
preparation in the source S and Gaussian quadrature dis-
placement applied in the modulator M . The untrusted chan-
nel is parametrized by transmittance η and excess noise ǫ.
The signal is coupled to the lossy side channel SA with un-
trusted output on the sender side and to the noisy side chan-
nel SB with untrusted input of variance VN on the receiving
side. The remote trusted party performs measurement with
the homodyne detector H. The trusted devices and channels
are within the dashed boxes. (b) Scheme of the CV QKD
with sender-side leakage modeled as coupling of the signal to
a vacuum mode on a beam splitter with transmittance ηA.
The receiver-side untrusted noise infusion is modeled as cou-
pling to a noisy mode with variance VN on a beam splitter
with transmittance ηB . The untrusted channels are within
the dashed box.
effects [28, 29] would not qualitatively change the results
of the paper.
Two types of side channels are considered in our study
as shown in Fig. 1(a). The first one (further also re-
ferred to as the type-A side channel) is the sender-side
side-channel leakage, when a vacuum mode is coupled to
the signal and only the output of the coupling CA is ac-
cessible by an eavesdropper. An eavesdropper Eve has
no control of the side-channel input and of the strength
of the coupling, thus the input state of such a side chan-
nel is initially vacuum. Eve however receives the side-
channel output similarly to non-invasive passive attacks
in classical cryptography [30]. The sender (Alice), on
the contrary, has full control of the input of such a side
channel before the coupling CA. The second type of side
channel (further also referred to as the type-B side chan-
nel) is untrusted noise addition in the receiver station. In
this case an untrusted noise with variance VN is suppos-
edly prepared by Eve and coupled to the signal prior to
detection with the output of the coupling being inacces-
sible to the eavesdropper. The eavesdropper is not able
to change the coupling strength. On the contrary, the
receiving side (Bob) is able to control (e.g., measure) the
output of the coupling CB . In both the cases we assume
that the trusted parties are not able to directly remove
the side channels or change the coupling strengths (CA
and CB , respectively).
These are the two main types of possible semitrusted
side channels, while the completely trusted noise is cov-
ered by previous research [17, 18, 21, 22] and completely
untrusted noise can be attributed to the channel. More-
over, the noise infusion on the sender side (symmetrical
to the type-B side channel on the receiver side that is
considered in the present paper) is equivalent to the ad-
ditional noise in the untrusted channel. At the same
time the side-channel loss on the receiver side (symmet-
rical to the type-A side-channel loss on the sender side
that is also considered here) is equivalent to the addi-
tional loss in the untrusted channel. Thus, our analysis
covers the main possible semitrusted side channels based
on the two-mode interaction in the prepare-and-measure
CV QKD.
We do not consider any specific physical realization of
the side channels applying our analysis to the general case
of semitrusted side channels based on the linear-optical
mode interaction. However, the side channels can be ex-
pected in any real implementation of CV QKD in either
fiber [7, 11] or free-space channels [31, 32], where co-
herent and squeezed states were successfully transferred.
The sender-side leakage can take place in particular in
the case of imperfect modulation, e.g., when the signal is
mixed with a temporal, spectral, polarization, or spatial
mode, which then leaves the sender station. The receiver-
side noise infusion may, e.g., be caused by imperfect light
collection from a free-space channel with a background
radiation.
Linear optical crosstalk is well studied in the classi-
cal optical communications where it is present in the
multiplexed channels and receivers [33], but was also re-
ported in the quantum communications [34]. Linear cou-
pling represented by the beam splitter transformation is
generally used to model the interaction of a quantum-
optical system with the environment [35]. Therefore, in
our work we use the typical linear optical interaction
and model the mode coupling between the signal and
the side channels as the beam splitters [see Fig. 1(b)].
The type-A side channel is modeled as coupling to a vac-
uum mode on a beam splitter with transmittance ηA.
On the other side we model the type-B side channel as
coupling to a thermal noise mode with variance VN on
a beam splitter with transmittance ηB. In the case of
the sender-side leakage (type-A) side channel the quadra-
ture that enters the quantum channel is then changed to
x′A = xA
√
ηA+xSCA
√
1− ηA, where xSCA is the quadra-
ture value of the vacuum state on the input of the beam
splitter, V ar(xSCA) = 1. In the case of the noise-infusing
(type-B) side channel the output of the quantum chan-
nel is changed as x′B = xB
√
ηB + xSCB
√
1− ηB, where
xSCB is the input noise of the type-B side channel with
V ar(xSCB) = VN .
In the analysis of the negative impact of the side chan-
nels on CV QKD and the methods to compensate for such
impact we mainly study the security against collective at-
tacks, which in the asymptotic limit were shown to be no
4less effective than the most general coherent attacks [36].
In this case Eve performs the optimal collective measure-
ment on the accessible modes after the process of bases
reconciliation is completed, implying that Eve attaches
a separate uncorrelated probe to each transmitted state
and keeps probes in a quantum memory until she can
gather additional information. To obtain simple insight
into the conditions for insecurity of the protocols we also
study the security against individual attacks, in which
case Eve is limited by the individual measurement on the
accessible modes. This weaker security analysis allows us
to analytically derive the regions of insecurity of the pro-
tocols in the presence of side channels since insecurity
against individual attacks implies insecurity against the
more effective collective attacks.
Following the generalization of the Czisza´r-Ko¨rner the-
orem [37] on the quantum measurements performed by
Devetak and Winter [38], the protocol is secure if the mu-
tual information between the trusted parties exceeds the
information available to Eve on the data on the trusted
receiver side (in the case of reverse reconciliation, which
is stable against channel loss [9]). The security is then
described by the positivity of the lower bound on the key
rate which in the case of collective attacks reads:
K = βIAB − χBE , (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the postprocessing efficiency and χBE
is Holevo bound that determines Eve’s achievable infor-
mation limit in the case of collective attacks [13, 14]. The
efficiency β depends on the effectiveness of the data post-
processing algorithms that are being used in the secure
key distillation given the particularly low signal-to-noise
ratio. We set β as an independent parameter and do not
consider any particular postprocessing algorithm. In the
following analysis we therefore fix the reconciliation effi-
ciency as β = 0.95, which is realistic taking into account
the recent progress in the error-correcting algorithms for
the Gaussian-distributed data [39].
The Holevo bound can be expressed as χBE = S(γE)−
S(γE|B) through the von Neumann entropy S(γE) of the
generally multimode state (including the side channels),
which is available to Eve for the collective measurement
described by the respective covariance matrix γE , and
the von Neumann entropy S(γE|B) of the state avail-
able to Eve conditioned on the measurement results of
the remote trusted party Bob [40] and described by the
covariance matrix γE|B. Covariance matrices are the ma-
trices of the second moments of quadratures of the form
γij = 〈rirj〉−〈ri〉〈rj〉, where ri = (xi, pi)T is the quadra-
ture vector of an i-th mode. Along with the first moments
the covariance matrices explicitly describe the Gaussian
states and are sufficient for the security analysis of the
Gaussian protocols [13, 14] due to the extremality of the
Gaussian states [41]. We analyze the security against
the collective attacks using the most general purification
method [40], where the equivalent entanglement-based
representation of the protocols is used and all the state
imperfections corresponding to the side channels and the
main channel are attributed to Eve.
In the case of individual attacks the upper bound on
the information available to an eavesdropper is given
by the Shannon mutual information IBE instead of the
Holevo bound and the lower bound on the key rate (in the
optimistic case of perfect postprocessing efficiency) reads
Kind = IAB − IBE . Details of calculations for security
analysis in the cases of both individual and collective at-
tacks are given in the Appendix, while here we present
the main expressions and results.
In the next section we study the negative impact of the
side channels on CV QKD.
III. NEGATIVE EFFECT OF SIDE CHANNELS.
A. Side-channel loss on the trusted sender side
Let us first consider the type-A side channel. We start
by analyzing the region of insecurity of the protocol with
respect to the individual attacks and without the un-
trusted channel noise. The mutual information in this
case reads (see the Appendix for details)
IAB =
1
2
log2
1
1− ηAηVM
ηAη(V−1)+1
, (2)
while the information available to Eve reads
IBE =
1
2
log2
[ηAη(V − 1) + 1][V − ηAη(V − 1)]
V
(3)
and is independent of the signal states (squeezed or co-
herent). As can be seen the side channel decreases the
mutual information between the trusted parties and in-
creases Eve’s information, therefore limiting the key rate
already for individual attacks with pure channel losses.
In the optimal (given perfect postprocessing β = 1)
limit of infinite squeezing and modulation (V →∞) upon
pure channel loss (ǫ = 0) the key rate for the standard
Gaussian CV QKD protocol can be written as
KV→∞ = λ log2
1
1− ηAη , (4)
where λ = 1 for the squeezed-state protocol and λ = 1/2
for the coherent-state one. The channel transmittance η
is therefore effectively decreased by the side-channel cou-
pling ηA. Thus the presence of the type-A side channel
does not break the security, i.e., the key rate remains pos-
itive for any nonzero value of ηA, as one would expect,
because the channel remains purely lossy.
If the channel noise is present, then the side-channel
loss increases the sensitivity of the protocol to the chan-
nel noise already in the case of the individual attacks. In
the limit of strong modulation V →∞ and strong chan-
nel loss η ≪ 1, the maximum tolerable channel noise is
ǫmax = ηA/2 for the standard coherent-state protocol
and ǫmax = ηA for the standard squeezed-state protocol
with arbitrarily strong squeezing.
5FIG. 2: Maximum tolerable excess noise dependence on the
channel losses (on a dB scale) and the type-A side-channel
coupling ratio ηA for the standard squeezed-state (top plot)
and coherent-state (bottom plot) protocols. Here β = 1and
V = 103.
In the case of collective attacks (see the Appendix for
details) the side-channel leakage on the trusted sender
side also lowers the key rate and substantially reduces
the tolerance to the channel excess noise, which is clearly
visible in Fig. 2, where the maximum tolerable channel
excess noise ǫmax (in shot-noise units, being the variance
of vacuum fluctuations) is plotted versus channel trans-
mittance and side-channel loss for the standard CV QKD
protocols with strong modulation.
B. Noise infusion on the trusted receiver side
The performance of the protocols is different in the
case of the type-B side channel. In this case the presence
of additional noise VN coupled to a signal can lead to the
security break already for the purely attenuating channel
(i.e., when ǫ = 0). The mutual information between the
trusted parties in this case is reduced by the noise VN
and reads
IAB =
1
2
log2
1
1− ηηBVM
ηB(ηV+1−η)+(1−ηB)VN
. (5)
The security break can be observed already in the case of
individual attacks upon pure channel loss. Eve’s upper
bound on the leaking information depends only on the
FIG. 3: Maximum tolerable excess noise dependence on the
channel losses (on a dB scale) and the type-B side-channel
coupling ratio ηB for the standard squeezed-state (top plot)
and coherent-state (bottom plot) protocols. Here β = 1, V =
103, and the side-channel noise variance VN = 1.05.
overall variance V and reads
IBE =
1
2
log2
ηB(ηV + 1− η) + (1− ηB)VN
ηBV
η+(1−η)V +
1−ηB
VN
. (6)
In the limit of strong modulation V → ∞ and strong
channel loss η ≪ 1 the bound on the side-channel noise
for either the squeezed- or coherent-state standard CV
QKD protocol reads
V maxN
∣∣V→∞
η≪1 =
1
1− ηB . (7)
In the more general case of collective attacks the side-
channel noise VN not only undermines the tolerance of
the protocol to the channel noise ǫ, but also leads to the
security break contrary to the type-A side-channel leak-
age. This can be seen from the profiles of the maximum
tolerable channel noise in the case of VN = 1.05, i.e.,
when the input of the type-B side channel only slightly
exceeds the shot-noise variance as shown in Fig. 3. Note
that the squeezed-state protocol appears to be more sta-
ble against the side-channel noise infusion (its security
region is larger in terms of the tolerable channel loss and
side-channel coupling at the given VN ). Thus, the pres-
ence of the side-channel leakage or noise infusion makes
the protocol more sensitive to the channel noise and
can even break the security for the purely attenuating
channel. In the next section we suggest the methods to
compensate for negative effects by manipulations at the
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FIG. 4: (a) Methods aimed at compensating for the negative
impact of the side channels: state manipulation on the input
of the type-A sender-side lossy side channel and monitoring
of the output of the type-B receiver-side noise-infusing side
channel using the monitoring homodyne detector H ′ and sub-
sequent data manipulation involving also the measurement
results from the main homodyne detector H . (b) Types of
state manipulation on the input of the type-A side chan-
nel: 1 (left), noise infusion using the source S2 producing
a thermal state with variance VNS ; 2 (middle), controllable
uncorrelated modulation on the side-channel input using the
modulator M2; and 3 (right), controllable correlated modula-
tion with displacement kxM proportional to the modulation
of the main signal using the modulator M2. In the case of the
squeezed-state protocol to achieve complete decoupling of the
side channel the side-channel input should be replaced by the
squeezed state with variances VS and 1/VS using the source
S2 prior to the modulator M2. In the case of the coherent-
state protocol such preparation is not needed and the source
S2 needs not be used.
trusted sides and without affecting the untrusted quan-
tum channel.
IV. DECOUPLING OF SIDE CHANNELS.
A. Side-channel loss on the trusted sender side
We suggest that the trusted sender (Alice) should look
for the input of the type-A side channel in the case it can-
not be removed completely and then apply state manip-
ulation on the side-channel input [see Fig. 4(a)]. Three
options can be considered depending on the accessibility
of the side channel and technical ability of Alice.
First, Alice can infuse Gaussian thermal noise to the
side channel by replacing the vacuum input of the side
channel with the source of noise with variance VNS [see
Fig. 4(b), left]. The efficiency of such method is how-
ever very limited. Indeed, such noise reduces the mutual
information
IAB =
1
2
log2
1
1− ηAηVM
η[ηAV+(1−ηA)VNS]+1−η
. (8)
However, it also, to some extent, decreases the Holevo
quantity due to a partial decoupling of the side chan-
nel from the main channel, but at the same time acts
as a preparation noise [18]. Thus, the addition of such
unknown noise is of limited helpfulness, when the main
channel has low loss, i.e., is short distance. Moreover,
for the squeezed-state protocol, where the Holevo bound
is effectively minimized by squeezing [27], the reduction
of the mutual information due to the presence of addi-
tional noise appears to be more harmful, so mostly the
unknown noise on the input of the side channel has ei-
ther no or a very limited positive effect. This can be
seen from the graphs in Fig. 5, where the key rate is
plotted versus distance d = −50 log10 η in a standard
telecom fiber with attenuation of −0.2dB/km (here and
in the following we plot the key rate in bits per measure-
ment). The improvement for the coherent-state protocol
is small but visible [upper (green) dotted line compared
to the lower (red) dotted one], while the improvement for
the squeezed-state protocol is negligible (the correspond-
ing curve overlaps with the one with no manipulation on
the side-channel input performed, given as the dotted red
line).
Second, Alice can use the additional modulator M2 on
her side to control the input of the side channel. Al-
ice’s modulation therefore shifts the quadrature of the
side-channel input xSCA. Let us assume that the ad-
ditional modulation (displacement) on the input of the
type-A side channel is independent from the main mod-
ulation performed on the signal, but is known to Alice
and contributes to her data and to the correlation with
Bob [see Fig. 4(b), center]. We can write the change
of the input of the lossy side channel in terms of the x
quadrature (calculations for the case when the p quadra-
ture is modulated and measured will be equivalent) as
x˜SCA = xSCA + xNM , where xNM is the shift, known
to Alice, with variance V ar(xNM ) = VNM . The mutual
information between the trusted parties in this case is
increased:
IAB =
1
2
log2
1
1− η(
√
ηAVM+
√
1−ηAVNM)2
(VM+VNM)
(
η[ηA(V−VNM)−ηA+ǫ]+1
)
(9)
due to increased correlations between the trusted par-
ties. However, it simultaneously decorrelates (reduces
the correlation with the main signal mode) the output
of the side channel and increases the information leak-
age from the main channel. Therefore, such additional
uncorrelated modulation on the input of the side chan-
nel VNM can play a positive role mainly when the side
channel is strong enough (typically ηA < 0.8) because
otherwise the information leakage from the main channel
prevails over the positive role of decoupling. Moreover,
7FIG. 5: Key rate secure against collective attacks versus dis-
tance in a standard telecom fiber (with an attenuation of
−0.2dB/km) for the squeezed-state protocol with VS = 0.1
(left) and the coherent-state protocol (right) in the presence
of the type-A side channel ηA = 0.4 and no compensating
methods (red dotted lines), with optimized unknown noise
on the input of the channel (green upper dotted line for the
coherent-state protocol), with optimized uncorrelated mod-
ulation on the input of the side channel (blue dashed lines),
with optimized correlated modulation on the input of the side
channel and no additional source S2 (coincides with the blue
dashed line for the squeezed-state protocol), and in the per-
fect case in the absence of the side channel, i.e., ηA = 1 (solid
black lines). The latter curve overlaps with the ones for the
optimized correlated modulation for the coherent-state pro-
tocol; for the optimized correlated modulation and squeezing
of the side-channel input; and for the optimized uncorrelated
modulation and squeezing on the input of the side channel for
the squeezed-state protocol. Here β = 0.95, ǫ = 5%, and the
modulation variance VM is optimized for the given parame-
ters.
the modulation variance VNM must be optimized for the
given setup parameters. However, such a method can
significantly increase the secure distance of the protocol
especially for the coherent-state protocol, as can be seen
from Fig. 5, where the corresponding key rate is given
as the blue dashed lines.
Third, we suggest the method of correlated modula-
tion on the input of the side channel and optionally ad-
ditional squeezing of the side-channel input in the case
of the squeezed-state protocol. Importantly, the method
uses only the classical correlation of the Gaussian quan-
tum states; no entanglement is required. The method as
we show below allows (i) complete decoupling of the mod-
ulation from the side channel (no fraction of the modu-
lation data appears on the side-channel output) and (ii)
complete decorrelation of the side-channel output from
the signal mode. These effects allow one to restore the
performance of the protocol and thus completely remove
the negative influence of the type-A side channel.
Indeed, Alice can apply the weighted correlated dis-
placement on the input of the side channel [see Fig.
4(b), right] with the factor k so that the input of
the side channel becomes x˜SCA = xSCA + kxM . Af-
ter the coupling between the signal and the modu-
lated side-channel input the quadratures are x′A =
xS
√
ηA + xSCA
√
1− ηA + xM (√ηA + k
√
1− ηA) and
x˜′SCA = xSCA
√
ηA−xS
√
1− ηA+xM (k√ηA−
√
1− ηA).
It is easy to see that when k =
√
(1− ηA)/ηA ≡
kopt the outputs of the side-channel coupling become
x′A = xS
√
ηA + xSCA
√
1− ηA + xM/√ηA and x˜′SCA =
xSCA
√
ηA − xS
√
1− ηA. Therefore, due to the destruc-
tive interference effect, the untrusted output of the side
channel contains no information on the signal displace-
ment xM , i.e., the side channel is completely decoupled
from the modulation. Then, in the case of the coherent-
state protocol since V ar(xSCA) = VS = 1 the correlation
between the outputs of the side-channel in the regime
of optimal correlated modulation with kopt vanishes, i.e.,
Cov(x′A, x˜
′
SCA) = 0 and the output of the side channel,
containing already no encoded information, becomes in
addition completely decorrelated from the signal mode.
The eavesdropper therefore cannot profit from such the
side channel. Importantly, both conditions above (decou-
pling the modulation and decorrelating the side channel)
are required to fully eliminate the side-channel effect. In
the case of the squeezed-state protocol the decorrelation
is achieved upon the additional manipulation on the in-
put of the side channel prior to the modulation so that
the vacuum state is replaced by the squeezed state with
variances (VS , 1/VS), equivalent to the signal state. Us-
ing this generated squeezing in addition to the optimal
correlated modulation, the output of the side channel
is completely decorrelated from the signal mode for the
squeezed-state protocol as well.
Interestingly, in the regime of the optimal modulation
with kopt the scheme becomes equivalent to the side-
channel attack on the signal prior to modulation; the
latter then becomes scaled by 1/
√
ηA as shown in Fig. 6.
In other words, the optimal correlated displacement with
kopt shifts the side-channel attack from the modulated
signal to the signal state before the modulation. This is
in fact an additional type of side-channel attack that can
also take place independently of any other side-channel
attacks. It is easy to see that in the case of the coherent-
state protocol such an attack yields no additional infor-
mation for Eve because the correlation between the out-
put of the side channel and the signal mode after the in-
teraction CASA =
√
ηA(1− ηA)[VS−V ar(xSCA)], which
is proportional to the difference of variances of the incom-
ing modes, becomes exactly zero [similarly to the method
of decoupling Eve from the main quantum channel (see
[42])]. In the case of the squeezed signal, however, such
an attack on the signal states leads to the nonzero cor-
relation between the signal state and the side-channel
output and this reduces the security of the squeezed-
state protocol, which, nevertheless, remains superior to
the coherent-state one in terms of key rate, distance, or
tolerable excess noise. Therefore, e.g., for VS = 0.1 the
optimally correlated displacement appears to be less ef-
fective than the uncorrelated one (Fig. 5). This can
be overcome if Alice is able to substitute the vacuum
input of the side channel by a squeezed state with the
same squeezing as the signal state, i.e., V ar(xSCA) = VS
should hold. In this case the correlations between the
squeezed signal states and the side-channel output upon
kopt vanish and the type-A side channel can be fully de-
coupled for the squeezed-state protocol as well. For de-
tails of the calculations see the Appendix.
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FIG. 6: Equivalent scheme of the method [depicted in Fig.
4(b), right], in the case of the optimal correlated displace-
ment with k =
√
(1− ηA)/ηA applied to the input of the side
channel. The side channel is effectively moved to the signal
state prior to the main modulator M and the displacement
on the signal is scaled as xM/
√
ηA. The source S2 should be
present in the squeezed-state protocol to achieve the complete
decoupling of the side channel.
The correlation between Alice and Bob in the regime of
optimal modulation with kopt changes to VM/
√
ηA (prior
to the main channel). Thus the key rate for the same VM
in the regime of complete decoupling of the type-A side
channel is quantitatively different from the key rate of the
protocol with the same modulation and in the absence
of the side channel. However, in the regime of imper-
fect postprocessing, i.e., β < 1, the modulation variance
needs to be optimized. With this optimization performed
the protocol with the complete decoupling of the type-
A side channel becomes fully equivalent in terms of the
maximum key rate, tolerable channel loss (or, equiva-
lently, maximum distance), and tolerable channel excess
noise to the protocol without the type-A side channel and
with optimized modulation for a given β. This leads in
particular to the overlap of the curves for the two proto-
cols in Fig. 5, where optimized key rates for the meth-
ods of the non-correlated modulation and of the unknown
noise infusion are also given for comparison. Therefore by
optimal decoupling of the type-A side channel using only
the correlated modulation and optionally squeezing on
the input of the side channel one can completely remove
its negative influence with no entanglement between the
main channel and side channel being required. Note that
the uncorrelated modulation can be also combined with
squeezing on the input of the side channel. This combi-
nation in the case of the squeezed-state protocol greatly
improves the method of uncorrelated modulation, mak-
ing it (provided the modulation is optimized) almost as
effective as the method of optimized correlated modu-
lation combined with squeezing (on the plots in Fig. 5
the corresponding line in the plotted region of parame-
ters overlaps with the black solid line corresponding to
the absence of the side channel and the difference corre-
sponding to the limited performance of the method can
only be seen for very low values of the key rate, which are
irrelevant due to unavoidable finite-size effects [28, 29]).
FIG. 7: Key rate secure against collective attacks versus dis-
tance in a standard telecom fiber (with an attenuation of
−0.2dB/km) for the squeezed-state protocol with VS = 0.1
(left) and the coherent-state protocol (right) in the presence
of the type-B noise-infusing side channel on the receiver side
without the side-channel monitoring (dashed lines) and with
optimal monitoring, perfectly coinciding with the profile of
the key rate without the side channel (solid black lines). The
side-channel coupling is ηB = 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 (from left to right,
i.e., red, green, and blue dashed lines respectively), β = 0.95,
ǫ = 5%, VN = 1.05, and the modulation variance VM is opti-
mized for the given parameters.
B. Noise infusion on the trusted receiver side
In the case when Eve couples an additional noise to the
signal prior to the detection at Bob’s side, the monitoring
of the coupling output, which is not accessible to Eve, can
be used. Then, by applying the proper manipulation on
the data from the main detector and from the monitoring
detector the negative influence of the type-B side channel
can also be fully compensated for.
We suggest the method of weighted subtraction of data
from the main and the monitoring detector and show
that the resulting measurement is free from the influ-
ence of the type-B side channel. Indeed, if the main
homodyne detector H (see Fig. 4) after the noise-
infusing side channel measures the quadrature x′B =
xB
√
ηB + xSCB
√
1− ηB, where xB is the output of the
main quantum channel and xSCB is the noise quadrature
of the type-B side channel input with V ar(xSCB) = VN ,
and the monitoring detector H ′ measures the quadrature
x′SCB = −xB
√
1− ηB + xSCB√ηB , then the weighted
difference ∆x = gx′B − g′x′SCB (and similarly for the p
quadrature) is free from the influence of the side chan-
nel for g =
√
ηB and g
′ =
√
1− ηB . Therefore, the
additional optimized monitoring on the output of the
noise-infusing side channel resulting in the detection of
∆x = xB can completely remove the negative impact of
such a side channel. Note that any pair of coefficients
satisfying g/g′ =
√
ηB/(1− ηB) fully restores the per-
formance of the protocol leading to ∆x ∝ xB, and the
linear scaling of the latter observable does not affect the
lower bound on the secure key rate.
The complete removal of the noise-infusing side chan-
nel is possible also with the imperfect detectors. If both
the main homodyne detector H and the monitoring de-
tector H ′ have efficiency ηD and excess noise, which
can be modeled by coupling of the signal to the noise
mode with the variance VD on the coupler ηD (this is
the standard model of the imperfect homodyne detector
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FIG. 8: Scheme of the CV QKD with the generalized interfer-
ometric coupling (parametrized by the transmittance values
ηB1 and ηB2 of the couplers and by the phase shift φ) to the
noisy side channel with untrusted input of variance VN on the
receiving side and the monitoring of the side-channel output
followed by the data manipulation.
used in the security analysis of CV QKD [40]), then the
settings g and g′ given above also remove xSCB from
the weighted difference ∆x and the variance then reads
V ar(∆x) = ηDV ar(xB) + (1 − η)VD. That is, the opti-
mal monitoring of the side-channel output then becomes
equivalent to the side-channel-free detection of the signal
on the same imperfect homodyne detector (the details of
the calculations are given in the Appendix), which con-
tains only the trusted noise and thus does not lead to the
security break in the reverse-reconciliation scheme [21].
To calculate the security against the collective attacks
we consider the scheme using the equivalent interfero-
metric setup, when the residual side channel is coupled
to the signal and then detected (see the Appendix for de-
tails). This leads to the appropriate transformations of
the variances and correlations. The results of calculations
are given in Fig. 7 without the side-channel monitoring
and with optimal monitoring of the residual side channel.
It is evident that the optimal side-channel monitor-
ing restores the performance of the protocol providing
exactly the same key rate as in the absence of the side
channel. The noise-infusing side channel can therefore be
completely compensated for. Simultaneously, the Gaus-
sian entanglement between the trusted parties is fully
restored even if it was previously broken by the effect of
noise infused in the side channel. Experimental aspects
of noise cancellation by the measurement have been stud-
ied in [43], which demonstrates the feasibility of such a
method for CV QKD. Note that the result reported here
is obtained under different conditions than the previous
analysis of the multimode channels [44, 45], where the
auxiliary channels received by Bob contain information
encoded by Alice, i.e., are parallel to the main quantum
channel.
We also consider the side-channel noise infusion based
on the generalized interferometric interaction modeled by
two couplers with different transmittance values ηB1 and
ηB2 and a phase shift φ in one of the arms between the
FIG. 9: Key rate secure against collective attacks versus
weighting of the data manipulation in the monitoring of the
type-B side channel with the generalized interferometric in-
teraction for the squeezed-state protocol with VS = 0.1 (up-
per lines) and the coherent-state protocol (lower lines) in the
absence of the type-B side channel (black horizontal dotted
lines), with no phase shift φ = 0 (dashed blue lines), with
φ = 0.5 (green dot-dashed lines), and φ = 1.5 (red solid lines).
The parameters of the interaction in the presence of the side
channel are ηB1 = 0.9 and ηB2 = 0.8, the modulation vari-
ance VM = 10, the channel transmittance is η = 0.1, and the
protocols implementation is otherwise perfect.
couplers as shown in Fig. 8. In this case the moni-
toring of the side-channel output suggested above can
fully restore the performance of the protocol only when
the phase shift is absent (i.e., φ = 0, see the Appendix
for the details) and the optimal coefficients of the data
manipulation read g = 1 and g′ =
(√
(1− ηB2)ηB2 +√
(1− ηB1)ηB1
)
/(1−ηB1−ηB2). The setting can be ob-
tained by maximizing the mutual information between
the trusted parties and therefore does not require the es-
timation of ηB1 and ηB2 independently. However, when
the nonzero phase shift is present and the output of the
interferometric coupling contains combinations of x and
p quadratures of the signal and the noise input, simple
side-channel monitoring by the homodyne detection in
the x quadrature and the linear data manipulation are
not sufficient to completely restore the performance of
the protocol. It can can be used to partly compensate
for the negative influence of the type-B side channel, as
shown in Fig. 9, where the key rate is plotted for the
coherent- and squeezed-state protocols with respect to
the weighting g′ (assuming g = 1), which can maximize
the mutual information and, respectively, the key rate.
The optimal data manipulation setting in the general
case becomes the lengthy function on the parameters of
the protocol, including the values of the coupling and the
phase shift as well as the signal and modulation variances
and the parameters of the channel. In order to improve
the decoupling of the side channel an optimal additional
phase shift can be applied prior to the control detection
(so that the mutual information is maximized) or a more
general strategy based on the heterodyne detection and
subsequent data manipulation could be used and opti-
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mized similarly to the elimination of the cross-talk in the
channel [44].
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the effect of the side-channel leakage
and noise infusion on the trusted sides of the continuous-
variable quantum key distribution protocols. The neg-
ative effect of the side-channel leakage on the trusted
sender side leads to the degradation of the key rate and
to the increased sensitivity of the protocol to the channel
noise. At the same time, the side-channel noise infusion
on the trusted receiver side can completely break the se-
curity of the protocols even upon pure channel loss. We
suggested and examined the method of additional mod-
ulation applied to the side-channel input being under
the control of a trusted sending party. We show that if
the additional modulation is properly correlated with the
main modulation on the signal and squeezing applied on
the side-channel input in the case of the squeezed-state
protocol, the negative impact of the lossy side channel
can be completely removed. Alternatively, we show the
possibility to compensate for the negative impact of the
noisy side channel on the receiver side by introducing
the monitoring of the output of the side channel. Since
both methods work independently by completely remov-
ing the side channels, they can be combined in a sin-
gle protocol. Moreover, since the optimal settings for
the methods are independent of the channel parameters,
the methods can be applied by the trusted parties using
only the parameters of their local trusted stations and
do not themselves rely on the channel estimation. Our
result therefore describes the effective and feasible meth-
ods of compensating for the quantum side channels in
a continuous-variable quantum key distribution between
the trusted parties, which do not require entanglement
or non-Gaussian operations.
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Appendix: Security analysis is detail
Here we provide detailed calculations for the secu-
rity analysis of the above-described Gaussian continuous-
variable quantum key distribution protocols with side
channels.
1. Scheme and parametrization
The scheme of the protocols is given in Fig. 1. As
mentioned, the channel is parametrized by transmit-
tance (loss) η and excess noise ǫ, while side channels are
parametrized by coupling ηA (for the sender-side type-A
lossy side channel) and by coupling ηB and excess noise
VN (for the receiver-side type-B noise-infusing side chan-
nel). The protocols in the prepare-and-measure (PM)
setting are based on the preparation of a signal state
(coherent or squeezed) characterized by the quadrature
values xS and pS which are Gaussian distributed around
zero with variances V ar(xS) = VS , V ar(pS) = 1/VS,
where VS ≤ 1 is generally the squeezed variance which
in the case of coherent states is saturated by VS = 1.
Here and in the following, with no loss of generality, we
assume that the states are squeezed and measured in the
x quadrature. The results for the p quadrature squeez-
ing and measurement are obtained by replacing x → p
and vice versa. The signal is modulated by applying
the displacement xM and pM randomly chosen from a
Gaussian distribution centered around zero with variance
V ar(xM ) = V ar(pM ) = VM so that the resulting quadra-
ture becomes xA = xS + xM . Here and in the following
the equivalent expressions apply to the p quadrature since
the main quantum channel and the side channels are as-
sumed to be phase insensitive (which is valid for typical
optical channels such as optical fiber or free-space links).
Now if the channel is present then quadrature values after
the channel are given by xB = (xA+xN )
√
η+x0
√
1− η,
where x0 is the quadrature value of the vacuum state
coupled to the signal to describe the loss, V ar(x0) = 1
and xN is the quadrature value of the excess noise,
V ar(xN ) = ǫ. If the side-channel loss is present at the
sender side (type-A side channel), then the signal is cou-
pled to the vacuum input of the side channel, which is
modeled by a beam splitter with transmittance ηA, which
is the side-channel loss. As it was mentioned, the quadra-
ture that enters the quantum channel is then changed
to x′A = xA
√
ηA + xSCA(
√
1− ηA), where xSCA is the
quadrature value of the vacuum state on the input of the
beam splitter, V ar(xSCA) = 1. If the noise-infusing side
channel is present, then, as mentioned in the main text,
the output of the quantum channel is further modified to
x′B = xB
√
ηB + xSCB
√
1− ηB, where xSCB is the input
noise of the type-B side channel with V ar(xSCB) = VN .
Knowing the transformation of the quadrature values we
can obtain the variances and correlations between the
quadratures and derive the covariance matrices describ-
ing the states shared between the trusted parties Alice
and Bob and available to an eavesdropper Eve, which
are then used in the security analysis below.
2. Secure key rate
As mentioned, we estimate the security of the proto-
cols in the presence of the side channels and upon addi-
tional manipulations aimed to remove the side channels,
as the value and positivity of the lower bound on the key
rate, which in the case of collective attacks (when Eve
is able to collectively measure her probe states after in-
teraction with the signal) and reverse reconciliation [9]
reads K = βIAB − χBE , where β ∈ (0, 1) is the post-
processing efficiency that takes into account the amount
of data that trusted parties lose due to imperfections of
the error correction algorithms, IAB is the mutual in-
formation between the trusted parties, and χBE is the
Holevo bound, giving the upper bound on the informa-
tion that is available to Eve. In the case of individual
attacks, when Eve is limited by the individual measure-
ment on her probe states, the Holevo bound is replaced
by the classical Shannon information between Eve and
Bob IBE .
3. Mutual information and individual attacks
In order to calculate the classical (Shannon) mutual
information we use the expression for Shannon entropies
in the case of Gaussian continuous distributions [46]
IXY =
1
2
log2
VX
VX|Y
, (A.1)
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where X and Y are two zero-mean Gaussian random
variables with variances VX ≡ 〈X2〉 and VY ≡ 〈Y 2〉, re-
spectively, and VX|Y = VX −C2XY /VY is the conditional
variance with CXY ≡ 〈XY 〉 the correlation (covariance)
between X and Y . Note that (A.1) is symmetrical with
respect to X and Y . In the case of the Gaussian proto-
cols considered in the paper, the variables are the quadra-
tures displacements being introduced by modulation and
the quadrature values measured on the remote side of the
channel and by a potential eavesdropper are all Gaussian
distributed. This allows us to calculate the mutual infor-
mation IAB and upper bound the information leakage
IBE in the case of individual attacks.
The calculation of the mutual information is straight-
forward. Following the expression (A.1), we can derive
the mutual information between Alice and Bob as IAB =
1
2 log2 (VA/VA|B), where VA is the variance of the data
imposed by Alice by displacement (typically equivalent
to VM ), while conditional variance VA|B = VA−C2AB/VB
involves correlation CAB = Cov(xM , xB), i.e., the co-
variance between the data kept by Alice and the data
measured by Bob, and the variance VB = V ar(xB) of
Bob’s measurement results (which is x′B if the type-B
side channel is present).
The calculation of Eve’s information, IBE , in the case
of individual attacks, is similar. It requires knowing the
variances of the modes that are available to Eve for the
individual measurements and correlations with the mea-
surement results on the side of Bob; these will be derived
in the particular cases below.
4. Collective attacks
In the case of collective attacks, as mentioned, the in-
formation, which is available to Eve, is bounded by the
Holevo quantity, which is the capacity of a bosonic chan-
nel between Eve and Bob. It is calculated as χBE =
S(γE) − S(γE|B), the difference of the von Neumann
(quantum) entropies S(γE) of the state of the modes,
which are available to Eve for a collective measurement
described by the covariance matrix γE , and S(γE|B) of
the same state conditioned on the measurement results
of Bob.
In the general case, when the excess noise is present in
the channel and/or in the type-B side channel, we use the
purification method [40], i.e., we assume that an eaves-
dropper Eve can purify the state shared by the trusted
parties, so S(γE) = S(γAB), where AB is generally a
multimode initially pure state shared between the trusted
parties in which all the impurity is assumed to be caused
by Eve’s collective attack. After Bob’s projective mea-
surement of one of the quadratures similar equivalence
holds for the conditioned states: S(γE|B) = S(γA|B).
Thus the Holevo bound in Eq. (1) is expressed as
χBE = S(γAB)− S(γA|B).
The entropy S(γAB) is determined from the symplectic
eigenvalues λi of the n-mode covariance matrix γAB as
S =
n∑
i=1
G
[
λi − 1
2
]
, (A.2)
where G is the bosonic entropic function [26]
G (x) = (x+ 1) log2 (x+ 1)− x log2 (x) . (A.3)
The subtrahend in the expression for the Holevo bound is
the entropy similarly determined by the symplectic eigen-
values of the respective conditional covariance matrix
γA|B after Bob’s projective measurement (with no loss
of generality, we assume measurement of the x quadra-
ture):
γA|B = γA − σB|A [XγBX ]MP σTB|A , (A.4)
where σB|A is the correlation matrix between mode B
and the rest of the trusted modes, X = Diag(1, 0, 0, 0),
where Diag denotes a diagonal matrix, and MP is the
Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of the matrix.
The purification [40] is typically based on introduc-
ing the entangled [also referred to as Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR)] sources, which are the two-mode vacuum
states described by the covariance matrices of the form
γEPR =
(
V I
√
V 2 − 1σz√
V 2 − 1σz V I
)
, (A.5)
where V is the variance of each of the two modes, I is
the 2x2 unity matrix and σz = Diag(1,0,0,-1). It is as-
sumed that Alice is performing a homodyne (in the x or
p quadrature) or heterodyne (in the x and p quadratures
simultaneously using two homodyne detectors on the
signal, split on a balanced beam splitter) measurement
on one of the modes, which conditionally prepares the
squeezed state with variance 1/V or coherent state in the
other mode, respectively. The unmeasured mode is then
being sent through the channel and the side channels.
Such a scheme is then equivalent to a PM scheme based
on squeezed or coherent states with VS = 1/V or VS = 1,
respectively (depending on the homodyne or heterodyne
measurement applied by Alice) and VM = V − VS . The
mode interactions in the side channels and the main chan-
nel based on the liner coupling are taken into account in
the covariance matrices using the input-output relations
for the quadrature vectors ri = (xi, pi)
T of interacting
modes 1 and 2 in the form(
r1
r2
)
out
=
( √
T I
√
1− T I
−√1− T I
√
T I
)(
r1
r2
)
in
, (A.6)
where T stands for the transmittance of a coupling beam
splitter. Such transformations lead to changes of vari-
ances and covariances that form the resulting covariance
matrices. The lower bound on the key rate secure against
collective attacks is then calculated numerically using
A.2 and A.3. In the case when modulation VM is in-
dependent of the signal squeezing VS the more general
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entanglement-based scheme [27] is used instead of the
standard EPR-based purification described above.
The purification method allows us to analyze the secu-
rity of the protocols in the conditions of untrusted noise
by estimating the lower bound on the secure key rate and
in particular to study the region of insecurity where the
lower bound turns to zero. Further, we describe the the-
oretical purification schemes used to calculate the Holevo
bound in the particular cases. Note that the purification
schemes give also the same mutual information IAB as
in the PM versions of the protocols. We also cross-check
our results using the entangling cloner [47] collective at-
tack being the particular purification of the channel noise
by an EPR source possessed by Eve, which is also widely
used in CV QKD security analysis as a typical collective
attack (see, e.g., [19, 20]). The results obtained using the
entangling cloner exactly confirm our calculations based
on the purification models.
5. Side-channel loss on the sender side
In the case of the type-A side channel, the variance of
Alice’s data is unchanged and remains VM and the corre-
lation between Alice and Bob is scaled by the channel and
the side channel so that CAB =
√
ηAηVM . The variance
of the state measured by Bob in the x quadrature after
the side channel and the main noisy and lossy channel
VB = η[ηAV + ǫ− ηA] + 1.
We first investigate the influence of the side channel
for the case of individual attacks with pure losses (ǫ = 0)
to estimate the security region. Taking into account the
above-given variances and correlations, the mutual infor-
mation IAB can be directly obtained as (2). In the case of
individual attacks in the purely lossy channel, Eve is able
to measure the output mode of the side channel, which
we denote by SA, and the output of the main channel
which we denote by E. Therefore, the mutual informa-
tion IBE using the symmetry of the mutual information
(A.1) is to be calculated as
IBE =
1
2
log2
VB
VB|ESA
, (A.7)
where VB|ESA is the variance of Bob’s measurement
conditioned by measurements of Eve on the modes E
and SA. The calculations taking into account the vari-
ances of Eve’s modes VE = (ηAV + 1 − ηA)(1 − η) + η,
and VSA = ηA + (1 − ηA)V and correlations CBE =
ηA
√
η(1 − η)(1− V ) and CBSA =
√
ηAη(1− ηA)(1− V )
result in the expression
VB|ESA =
V
ηAη(1 − V ) + V (A.8)
from which the expression (3) is obtained.
In the case when the channel noise is present we model
Eve’s individual attack as an optimal entangling cloner
[47], i.e., we assume that Eve possesses the two-mode
entangled source E1E2 with the variance N = 1+
ηǫ
1−η so
that the mode E1 interacts with the signal and introduces
the loss η and the excess noise ǫ. Eve is then able to
measure three modes: the output of the side channel
SA and the modes E1 and E2 of the entangling cloner.
Therefore, the mutual information IBE between Eve and
Bob should read
IBE =
1
2
log2
VB
VB|SAE1E2
, (A.9)
where VB|SAE1E2 is the variance of Bob’s measurement
conditioned by measurements of Eve on the modes SA,
E1, and E2. The variances of the modes after the side
channel and the main channel are VB = η[ηAV + 1 −
ηA + ǫ] + 1 [which also changes the mutual information
(3)], VSA = ηA + (1− ηA)V is unchanged by the channel
noise, E1 = ηN + (1 − η)(ηAV + 1 − ηA) and E2 =
N . The correlations are CBSA =
√
ηAη(1 − ηA)(1 − V ),
CBE1 =
√
η(1− η)(N − ηAV − 1 + ηA), and CBE2 =√
(1− η)(N2 − 1). From this the conditional variance
VB|SAE1E2 =
1 + ηA(V − 1)
1 + ηǫ + ηA(V − 1)[1− η(1 − ǫ)] (A.10)
can be obtained and used to calculate the key rate secure
against the individual attacks in a noisy channel.
In the case of collective attacks in a noisy channel and
no additional manipulation on the side-channel input the
security is calculated through the 4x4 covariance matrix
γAB =
(
VI
√
ηAη (V 2 − 1)σz√
ηAη (V 2 − 1)σz [(V − 1)ηAη + ǫη + 1]I
)
,
(A.11)
which describes the state shared between the trusted par-
ties in the EPR-based version of the protocols. The con-
ditional matrix after the measurement at Bob in partic-
ular contains ηA separately from η and reads
γA|B =
(
V − ηAη(V 2−1)1+η(ηAV−ηA+ǫ) 0
0 V
)
. (A.12)
From these two matrices the security of the protocol can
be analyzed for the case of collective attacks. We do not
provide the explicit expressions for the multimode covari-
ance matrices in the further analysis since they are too
lengthy; Thowever, they can be directly obtained using
the input-output relations A.6 and the details of the pu-
rification schemes given below. Further, we present the
purification schemes for the different methods of the side-
channel decoupling as well as the changes of the variances
and correlations of measured data upon the additional
manipulations on the side channels.
First, if the uncorrelated noise is added to the input
of the side channel, it is modeled as the coupling of one
of the modes of the EPR source N [see Fig. 10, (a)]
to the side-channel input using a strongly unbalanced
beam splitter with transmittance (for mode SA) T1 → 1.
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FIG. 10: (a) Theoretical purification of the equivalent PM
scheme with the side-channel loss on the sender side and ther-
mal noise applied on the input of the side channel. (b) Pu-
rification of the PM scheme with the side-channel loss on the
sender side and known modulation applied on the input of the
side channel. Homodyne or heterodyne detection is applied at
the side of Alice in both the cases depending on the protocol.
The variance of the source is respectively set to N =
VNS/(1− T1); this way the noise is added losslessly.
The state of the modes ABCD contains all the puri-
fied trusted noise and the Holevo bound for the standard
Gaussian protocols is then calculated following the pu-
rification method as χBE = S(γABCD) − S(γACD|B). If
the known modulation is applied to the side-channel in-
put, then the purification is based on a similar scheme
but the second mode of the EPR source N is coupled to
the mode A, measured by Alice. This way the displace-
ment that is applied to the input of the side channel is
also added to the displacement measured by Alice [see
Fig. 10, (b)]. Alice’s data in this case have the vari-
ance VA = VM + VNM , while the correlation with Bob
after the side channel and the main channel is given by
CAB =
√
η(
√
ηAVM +
√
1− ηAVNM ). Bob’s measured
variance is VB = η[ηA(V −VNM )−ηA+ ǫ]+1. From this
expression the expression for the mutual information (9)
is directly obtained.
The calculations are then similar to the previous case.
In both cases, if the generalized scheme in which modu-
lation is independent from the signal states is to be used,
then the main source EPR:V is replaced with the re-
spective entanglement-based generalized preparation as
described in [27]. The manipulations on the side channel
remain purified as described above.
Finally, if the correlated displacement is added and the
input of the side channel is additionally squeezed to VS ,
then the variance of Alice’s data remains VM , but the
correlation with Bob is changed to CAB =
√
η(
√
ηA +
k
√
1− ηA)VM and the variance of the state measured at
the Bob’s side is VB = η[2kVM
√
ηA(1− ηA) + k2VM (1−
ηA)− ηAVM + VS + ǫ− 1] + 1. From this the expression
for the mutual information can be obtained in the general
case.
For the optimal k =
√
(1− ηA)/ηA and with the side-
channel input substituted by the squeezed state with
variances VS and 1/VS (in the case of the squeezed-
state protocol) it is easy to see that the main sig-
nal mode and the side-channel output described by
x′A = xS
√
ηA + xSCA
√
1− ηA + xM (√ηA + k
√
1− ηA)
and x˜′SCA = xSCA
√
ηA − xS
√
1− ηA + xM (k√ηA −√
1− ηA), respectively become completely uncorrelated,
i.e., Cov(x′A, x˜
′
SCA) = 0. Therefore, the side channel
becomes decoupled from the main signal. For the cal-
culations of the Holevo bound the equivalent scheme de-
picted in Fig. 6 must be purified. This is done by in-
troducing the EPR source MN (see Fig. 11) with vari-
ance VM/[ηA(1 − T1)]. It is coupled to the signal state
produced by the source S in the mode B and to the
infinitely squeezed state used for simulating the detec-
tion, produced by the source S0 in the mode A on the
strongly unbalanced beam splitters with the transmit-
tance for the modes A and B being T1 → 1. The
input of the side channel is optionally squeezed using
squeezer S2 in the case of the squeezed-state protocol.
The state that is then sent through the channel (mode
B) is then defined by the single-mode covariance matrix
γB = Diag(T1VS+VM/ηA, T1/VS+VM/ηA). In the limit
T1 → 1 this is equivalent to the preparation of a sig-
nal state VS , attacked by the side channel with input
VS (prepared by Alice in the case of the squeezed-state
protocol), which leaves the signal state unchanged, and
subsequent symmetrical (having the same variance in the
both the x and p quadratures) Gaussian modulation with
variance VM/ηA. The correlation between the measure-
ments at Alice and at Bob in the absence of the quan-
tum channel is CAB = −
√
(VM/ηA)2 − (1 − T1)2, which
is equivalent to the modulation with variance VM/ηA ap-
plied by Alice in the PM setup when T1 = 1. The state
that is measured by Alice (mode A) is defined by γA =
Diag(T1V0 + VM/ηA, T1/V0 + VM/ηA), where V0 is the
variance of the squeezed state, produced by the source
S2. The first element of matrix γA, which is measured by
the x-quadrature homodyne measurement, in the limit of
V0 → 0, corresponds to Alice perfectly knowing the dis-
placements of the modulation VM/ηA in the PM setup.
After the measurement at the Alice’s side the state that
is conditionally prepared on the channel input is given by
γB|A = Diag
(
T1VS + [ηA(T1 − 1)2 + T1V0VM ]/(ηAT1V0 +
VM ), T1/VS+VM/ηA
)
, which in the regime of T1 = 1 and
V0 = 0 gives Diag(VS , 1/VS + VM/ηA), corresponding to
the modulation of the signal state Diag(VS , 1/VS) with
variance VM/ηA in both the quadratures with only one
value x being kept. Our purification scheme (see Fig. 11)
is therefore equivalent to the PM one (shown in Fig. 6),
providing (in the limits T1 → 1 and V0 → 0) the same
variances and correlations, and resulting in the same con-
ditional states. Moreover, the developed scheme allows
purification of practically any PM scheme being more
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FIG. 11: Theoretical purification of the equivalent PM scheme
with the side-channel loss on the sender side and the optimal
correlated modulation applied on the input of the side chan-
nel precessed by the optional squeezed-state preparation on
the source S2 in the case of the squeezed-state protocol as
depicted in Fig. 6. The source S0 produces an infinitely
squeezed state, the entangled source EPR:MN provides the
modulation of the signal, and the trusted parties perform ho-
modyne detection on their respective modes A and B.
adjustable than the standard EPR-based approach [40].
The asymmetrical modulation can be introduced by the
general preparation of the state EPR : MN using two
different orthogonally squeezed states, however, such an
extension was not needed in the tasks of the present pa-
per.
In the purification scheme the state of the modes
ABCD is pure, while the channel noise and loss introduce
impurity to the state. The mode SA is not relevant in the
scheme since it is uncorrelated from the rest of the setup
due to the equality of the variances of modes A and SA
prior to the side-channel coupling ηA (it is shown on the
scheme only for explanatory purposes). Then the Holevo
bound is calculated as χBE = S(γABCD)− S(γACD|B).
6. Side-channel noise infusion on the receiver side
In the case of the type-B side channel the variance
of Alice’s data remains VM and the correlation between
Alice and Bob is scaled by the channel and the side
channel so that CAB =
√
ηηBVM . The variance of the
state measured by Bob in the x quadrature after the
main noisy and lossy channel and the side channel is
VB = ηB [η(V + ǫ) + 1− η] + (1− ηB)VN .
Let us first consider the individual attacks in the purely
attenuating main channel, i.e., ǫ = 0. Taking into ac-
count the above-given variances and correlations, the mu-
tual information IAB can be directly obtained as (5). In
the case of individual attacks in the purely lossy chan-
nel Eve is able to measure the output mode of the main
channel, which we denote by E. Moreover, Eve controls
the input of the noisy side channel, which we introduce
as an entangling cloner attack, which was shown to be
optimal in the case of individual attacks [47]. Therefore,
we assume that Eve possesses the two-mode entangled
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FIG. 12: Theoretical purification of the equivalent PM scheme
with the side-channel noise addition on the receiver-side and
the optimal monitoring of the side-channel output, repre-
sented by the interferometric scheme applied on the output
of the side channel prior to the trusted detection; the homo-
dyne or heterodyne detection is applied at the side of Alice
depending on the protocol.
source E1E2 with the variance VN and is able to mea-
sure one of the modes E1, while the other mode E2 is
coupled to the signal on the ηB beam splitter. There-
fore, the mutual information IBE using the symmetry of
the mutual information (A.1) is to be calculated as
IBE =
1
2
log2
VB
VB|EE1
, (A.13)
where VB|EE1 is the variance of Bob’s measurement con-
ditioned by measurements of Eve on the modes E and
E1. The calculations taking into account the variances
of Eve’s modes VE = V (1 − η) + η, and VE1 = VN
(since is Eve is measuring the mode of the cloner that
did not interact with the signal) and correlations CBE =√
ηηB(1 − η)(1 − V ) and CBE1 =
√
(1− ηB)(V 2N − 1)
(the latter provided by the correlations within the entan-
gling cloner) result in the expression
VB|EE1 =
ηBV
V (1 − η) + η +
1− ηB
VN
(A.14)
from which the expression (6) is obtained.
If the main homodyne detector H and the monitoring
detector H ′ (see Fig. 4) are both imperfect with loss
ηD and noise of the variance VD, which is coupled to
the signal with the ratio ηD [40], then the quadratures
measured by the detectors H and H ′ will be given by
x′B =
√
ηD(xB
√
ηB + xSCB
√
1− ηB) + x1
√
1− ηD
(A.15)
and
x′SCB =
√
ηD(−xB
√
1− ηB + xSCB√ηB) + x2
√
1− ηD
(A.16)
respectively, where x1 and x2 are the quadrature values
associated with the detector noise such that V ar(x1) =
V ar(x2) ≡ VD. The weighted difference ∆x = gx′B −
g′x′SCB will then be given by
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∆x = xB
√
ηD(g
√
ηB + g
′√1− ηB) + xSCB√ηD(g√1− ηB − g′√ηB) +√1− ηD(gx1 − g′x2) (A.17)
By setting the weights of the difference to g =
√
ηB and
g′ =
√
1− ηB the result of the subtraction becomes
∆x = xB
√
ηD+
√
1− ηD(x1√ηB−x2
√
1− ηB), (A.18)
where the noise of the side channel given by the quadra-
ture value xSCB is completely removed. The variance
of the weighted difference then becomes V ar(∆x) =
ηDVB+(1−ηD)VD, i.e. equivalent to the measurement of
the signal xB on the imperfect homodyne detector with
loss ηD and noise VD; the scaling
√
ηD then also applies
to the correlation CAB. When the detection is purely
lossy, i.e., VD = 1, the expression then further simplifies
as V ar(∆x) = ηDVB + 1− ηD.
In the case of collective attacks in the noisy channel
and in the presence of the type-B side channel we use
the purification scheme based on the entangled source of
modes A and B of variance V with mode A measured on
the Alice’s side with the homodyne or heterodyne detec-
tor. In this case the noisy mode SB is assumed to be pu-
rified by Eve (see Fig. 12). However, it is reflected by the
beam splitter with transmittance T0 = 0 fed by the vac-
uum input and the fully reflected mode C is then coupled
on the unbalanced beam splitter T with the signal mode
B. Then all the impurity of the state shared between Alice
and Bob is attributed to Eve and the following equalities
hold: S(γE) = S(γABC) and S(γE|B) = S(γAC|B).
Further, we equivalently represent the type-B side-
channel output monitoring and data manipulation by
an interferometric scheme, when the outputs of the side-
channel coupling ηB (modes B and C in the purification
scheme) are coupled again on a beam splitter with trans-
mittance T . The case when the interferometric setup is
properly balanced, i.e., T = ηB , corresponds to the opti-
mized monitoring on the output of the type-B side chan-
nel, as described in the main text. Indeed, the quadra-
ture measured on the signal mode B after all the interac-
tions is given by x′B = xB[
√
TηB +
√
(1− T )(1− ηB)] +
xSCB[
√
ηB(1 − T )−
√
T (1− ηB)], where xB is the main
signal mode before the side-channel interaction and xSCB
is the side-channel input prior to interaction. It is easy to
see that upon T = ηB the resulting quadrature x
′
B = xB
of mode B contains no side-channel noise due to the de-
structive interference and the negative effect of the side
channel is removed completely. Note that if the reflection
of the mode SB on the beam splitter T0 would be absent
and the mode B would be directly coupled to the mode
SB on the beam splitter with transmittance T , the equiv-
alent measurement that removes the type-B side channel
would be on the mode SB upon T = 1 − ηB . The de-
scribed scheme allows calculations using the purification
method simply as χBE = S(γABC)− S(γAC|B) since the
side-channel output monitoring emulated by the interfer-
ometric setup does not change the purity of the states.
The performance of the protocol thus becomes equiva-
lent to the one of the protocol without the type-B side
channel, which is confirmed in the case of collective at-
tacks in a noisy channel. In the case of the generalized
preparation (when modulation is independent of the sig-
nal state variance) we apply a similar scheme but replace
the EPV:V source with the generalized entangled state
preparation as described in [27].
In the case of the interferometric-type interaction be-
tween the signal and the type-B side channel, as shown in
Fig. 9, the mode transformations during the interactions
become more complex and read
x′B = xB
[√
ηB1ηB2 − cosφ
√
(1− ηB1)(1− ηB2)
]
+ xSCB
[√
ηB2(1− ηB1) +
+ cosφ
√
ηB1(1− ηB2)
]− pB sinφ√(1− ηB1)(1− ηB2) + pSCB sinφ√ηB1(1− ηB2) (A.19)
and
x′SCB = xB
[−√ηB1(1− ηB2)− cosφ√ηB2(1− ηB1)]+ xSCB[ cosφ√ηB1ηB2 −
−
√
(1− ηB1)(1− ηB2)
]− pB sinφ√ηB2(1 − ηB1) + pSCB sinφ√ηB1ηB2 (A.20)
now involving the contributions from the p quadratures
pB and pSCN of the signal and side-channel noise modes
respectively, which is caused by the phase shift in the in-
teraction. This prevents the complete decoupling of the
type-B side channel by simple manipulation on the ho-
modyne measurement results in the form gx′B − g′x′SCB,
as illustrated in Fig 9 (plotted based on the numerical
calculations using the equivalent transmittance T in the
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purification-based scheme). The complete decoupling in
such a case is possible only when φ = 0 and the cross-
quadrature terms are absent.
